Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Anderson, John E. et al.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of
12-1-2007
Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction
John E. Anderson
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Jeffrey Clemens
Harvard University
Andrew Hanson
Marquette University, andrew.r.hanson@marquette.edu
Published version. National Tax Journal, Vol. 60, No. 4 (December 2007): 769-785. Permalink. ©
2007 National Tax Association.
Andrew Hanson was affiliated with Syracuse University at the time of publication.
Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction
769
National Tax Journal
Vol. LX, No. 4
December 2007
Abstract - In this paper we examine the economic implications of 
several policy options for capping the mortgage interest deduction 
(MID). We extend the standard user–cost model of owner–occupied 
housing to include a cap on the mortgage size receiving tax–favored 
status. Our user–cost estimates for taxpayers with mortgages above 
the current–law cap are 4.41 percent higher than estimates from a 
model without the cap. We simulate the share of mortgage dollars 
that would be subject to three alternative cap policy variants and 
summarize the distributional impacts of each proposal, computing 
the share of mortgage dollars impacted across U.S. Metropolitan 
Areas. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Public policy designed to encourage home ownership in the United States operates primarily through incentives 
contained in the federal income tax system. The largest 
housing–related subsidy in the federal income tax code is 
the mortgage interest deduction (MID), which, as estimated 
by the Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget (OMB), reduced 
income tax revenues by $79.9 billion1 in ﬁ scal year 2007 
(Executive Ofﬁ ce of The President, 2007). This makes the 
MID the second largest tax expenditure, exceeded only by 
the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance 
premiums and medical care. 
The MID alters the user cost of owner–occupied housing 
for taxpayers, making it more attractive to purchase a home.
However, its effectiveness at encouraging home ownership 
has been a point of contention. Since the subsidy is based 
on the amount of interest paid on a mortgage, larger sub-
sidies are provided to those purchasing more expensive 
homes (subject to the current cap of $1 million). While this 
certainly provides an incentive for people to increase their 
consumption of housing, it may not be particularly effective 
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 1 It should be noted, however, that the Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget 
estimates the cost of the MID as a tax expenditure using a simple estima-
tion method based on the number of itemizing households and the size of 
the interest deductions. Some research suggests that behavioral responses 
to the elimination of the MID may make the actual cost much smaller. For 
example, Follain and Melamed (1998) argue that elimination of the MID 
would induce households to reﬁ nance their homes, substituting equity 
for debt. Taking this portfolio shufﬂ ing into account, they estimate that 
elimination of the MID would add only $10 billion in additional revenue 
each year.
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in altering the choice between renting 
and owning (i.e., tenure choice). Policies 
like those considered here, which lower 
the cap on the number of mortgage dol-
lars that qualify for the MID may better 
target the subsidy towards those on the 
margin between owning and renting, and 
away from inframarginal households that 
would choose to own a home whether 
they receive a subsidy or not.
In order to examine the economic 
implications of capping the MID, we 
extend the standard user–cost model of 
the rental price of housing to include a cap 
on the amount of mortgage that receives 
tax–preferred status. Although a $1 mil-
lion cap currently exists, this feature has 
not been included in earlier user–cost 
models.2 We use this model to show that 
capping the MID changes the user cost of 
housing through the share of the mortgage 
exceeding the cap. 
The issue of capping the MID is becom-
ing increasingly important for two pri-
mary reasons. First, the current–law cap 
is not adjusted for inﬂ ation and, hence, 
will affect more mortgages over time as 
home–price inﬂ ation pushes increasing 
numbers of tax payers over the $1 million 
ceiling. Second, the recommendation by 
the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Tax Reform (the Panel) to create partially 
regionally adjusted caps for the MID 
(based on median home prices) makes it 
clear that policy advisers have an inter-
est in changing current law. Our paper 
examines several ways of capping the 
MID: lowering the national limit, creat-
ing a set of limits that are fully adjusted 
for local home prices, and the partially 
regionally adjusted limits recommended 
by the Panel. 
We use data on individual mortgages 
to simulate the average share of each 
mortgage in excess of the caps that apply 
through current law as well as our three 
alternative policies. For the current–law 
cap, our national estimates show that less 
than one–half of one percent (0.39 percent) 
of mortgage originations exceed the cap, 
and on average just 0.13 percent of mort-
gage dollars are subject to the cap. The 
caps recommended by the Panel would 
raise the number of mortgages subject to 
the cap to approximately 13 percent, and 
the average share of mortgage dollars 
subject to the cap to 3.44 percent. Regional 
variation in the effect of the Panel’s caps is 
striking, ranging from negligible effects in 
some MSAs to a high of 67 percent of the 
mortgages (and, on average, 23 percent 
of mortgage dollars) subject to the cap 
in the San Francisco, CA, Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA). We also provide 
MSA–level simulations for a uniform 
national cap and a fully regionalized cap, 
both designed to affect the same share of 
mortgage dollars as the caps in the Panel’s 
proposal to facilitate comparison. 
Our analysis shows that estimates that 
do not consider caps can significantly 
understate user costs for mortgages (both 
under current law and alternative poli-
cies). For the average mortgage in excess 
of the current–law cap, for example, not 
accounting for the cap would understate 
the user cost by about 4.4 percent (around 
$4,000 annually). 
The remainder of the paper begins with 
a summary of previous studies that have 
examined the tax treatment of housing 
in general, and the MID in particular. 
Then we present our extension of the 
standard user–cost model. The main 
section of the paper then discusses three 
alternative proposals for changing the 
cap applied to the MID. The simulations 
in this section show the fraction of mort-
gages and the average share of mortgage 
dollars in excess of each cap. We then 
provide estimates of how each cap would 
affect the user cost of housing. The ﬁ nal 
 2 Homeowners may also deduct interest payments on loans for up to $100,000 that are backed by home equity, 
which raises the effective cap on tax–preferred debt borrowing to $1.1 million. 
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section of the paper summarizes the main 
results.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Economists have long been concerned 
about the efﬁ ciency and equity effects of 
housing subsidies. Rosen (1985) reviews 
the early literature, showing that these 
subsidies have signiﬁ cant effects on both 
the tenure choice and on the quantity 
of housing consumed. Conditional on 
home ownership, Rosen (1979a) estimates 
that without tax subsidies U.S. residents 
would have lived in homes that were nine 
to 17 percent less valuable than their cur-
rent homes in 1970, depending on their 
income level. King (1981) similarly esti-
mates that the elimination of tax subsidies 
for housing in the United Kingdom would 
reduce the quantity of housing consumed 
by about 13.7 percent. 
Rosen (1979a, 1985) also translates these 
consumption distortions into efﬁ ciency 
loss estimates. He calculates that his esti-
mates for 1970 translate into an average 
annual excess burden of about $192 in 
1980 dollars. Rosen (1985) also notes that 
some of the early literature expressed 
a concern that subsidy–induced hous-
ing consumption comes at the expense 
of business investment (e.g., Summers 
(1980)). However, he notes that prior to 
1985 the econometric evidence on this 
issue was insufficient to establish this 
relationship conclusively. 
Mills (1989) provides evidence on 
the efficiency of the allocation of the 
capital stock in the United States. He 
uses national income data over the period 
1929–1986 and computes the return to 
housing capital compared to all other 
private ﬁ xed capital. His results indicate 
that the real returns to capital have been 
smaller in housing than for non–housing 
ﬁ xed capital, suggesting overinvestment 
in housing. The President’s Advisory 
Panel report (2005) includes a comparison 
of the effective tax rates on different types 
of investment, as calculated by the Trea-
sury Department. Their estimates report 
that the marginal effective tax rate for 
owner–occupied housing is zero percent, 
while the rate is 17 percent for non–cor-
porate business, 26 percent for corporate 
business, 22 percent for the business sector 
as a whole, and 14 percent economy–wide. 
Such differences in effective tax rates are 
ultimately bound to distort the allocation 
of capital. 
Rosen (1985) also discusses two sig-
niﬁ cant early studies on the tenure choice 
between owner–occupied and rental 
housing. Rosen and Rosen (1980) estimate 
that tax subsidies for owner–occupied 
housing raised the home–ownership rate 
by about four percent in 1974. Hender-
shott and Shilling (1982) provide slightly 
higher estimates in the range of ﬁ ve to 
6.5 percent, depending on the assumed 
average marginal income tax rate.  
On the equity front, both Rosen (1979a) 
and King (1981) extend their analyses to 
assess the distributional implications of 
eliminating housing tax subsidies. Both 
studies ﬁ nd that the elimination of these 
subsidies would tend to reduce income 
inequality relative to the status quo. Rosen 
(1979a) shows that this result would hold 
in the United States (although to a lesser 
degree) even if total tax revenues are held 
constant via a proportional tax cut. Ander-
son and Roy (2001) examined the distribu-
tional impact of eliminating housing tax 
preferences, including the elimination of 
both the mortgage interest and property 
tax deductions. Their simulations show 
that elimination of these housing tax 
preferences would increase the progres-
sivity of the income tax signiﬁ cantly, as 
measured by the change in the Suits index 
with a bootstrapped conﬁ dence interval. 
Effects of major tax reforms on hous-
ing have also been examined in the lit-
erature. Notably, Follain and Ling (1991) 
analyzed the effects of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA86) on both renters 
and homeowners. TRA86 reduced the 
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overall size of the federal housing subsidy 
by more than 30 percent. It did that by 
reducing subsidies for both renters and 
owners. For owner–occupants, the value 
of the MID fell as marginal tax rates were 
reduced. Their most surprising result 
was that the distribution of the housing 
subsidy was just as skewed in favor of 
high–income households after TRA86 as 
it was before. Their result was surprising 
since TRA86 reduced marginal income 
tax rates (an important determinant of the 
size of the housing subsidy), and reduced 
them most signiﬁ cantly for high–income 
taxpayers. However, other elements of 
TRA86 reduced the value of the MID for 
low– and moderate–income households. 
These elements included an increase in the 
standard deduction and a reduction of the 
number and size of non–housing deduc-
tions. Follain and Ling show that the MID 
was made essentially worthless for many 
households with incomes below $42,500. 
Poterba (1992) also analyzed the distribu-
tion of the MID before and after TRA86, 
finding a similar pattern. More recent 
conﬁ rmation of this result is provided by 
Bourassa and Grigsby (2000), who report 
that in 1998 deductions were itemized by 
only three percent of owner–occupants 
with incomes below $20,000 per year, 16 
percent of those with incomes between 
$20,000 and $29,000, and 34 percent of 
those with incomes between $30,000 and 
$39,000. 
The advantages of the MID also apply 
unevenly across regions of the country 
due to variations in the rate of itemiza-
tion and housing prices. Consequently, 
the incentive effects of the MID are not 
uniform, but vary in systematic ways 
across regions and metropolitan areas. 
Using 1995 IRS tax data, Brady, Cronin 
and Houser (BCH) (2003) ﬁ nd that just 
21 percent of taxpayers itemize in the 
West–South–Central region of the United 
States, while 38 percent itemize in the 
New England and Mid–Atlantic regions. 
For those taxpayers who do itemize, the 
average size of the MID varies from $5,700 
in the West–North–Central region to 
$10,000 in the Paciﬁ c region. The average 
tax savings due to the MID ranged from 
$1,100 in the East–South–Central region 
to $2,100 in the Paciﬁ c region. BCH also 
investigated the regional causes of MID 
variation, ﬁ nding that both individual 
characteristics (e.g., income, age, tax ﬁ l-
ing status, and number of dependents) 
and regional characteristics (e.g., hous-
ing prices and state/local taxes) account 
for a substantial share of the variation in 
MID usage and size. Regional variation in 
house prices and state/local taxes account 
for 61 percent of the regional variation 
in the probability of itemizing, and 67 
percent of the variation in the amount of 
mortgage interest deducted. 
Past work has also looked at the 
potential for new policies to better target 
housing subsidies towards those on the 
margin between owning and renting. 
For example, Green and Vandell (1999) 
examine a hypothetical revenue–neutral 
switch from the current MID and prop-
erty tax deduction to an appropriately 
conﬁ gured housing tax credit. Using a 
user cost framework and a tenure choice 
model, they demonstrate that such a 
policy change could feasibly increase 
aggregate homeownership rates by three 
to ﬁ ve percent. Additionally, these poten-
tial increases in homeownership rates are 
highest in low–income neighborhoods. 
MODELING HOUSING TAX SUBSIDIES 
We begin with the user–cost framework 
that has been developed and employed in 
much of the research in this ﬁ eld, includ-
ing notable studies by Rosen (1979a, 
1979b, 1985), Poterba (1984, 1992), Green 
and Vandell (1999), Glaeser and Shapiro 
(2002), and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 
(2005). We extend the standard user–cost 
model of home ownership to include a cap 
on the mortgage amount on which inter-
est paid qualiﬁ es for a tax deduction. The 
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previous models highlight many of the 
factors affecting the size of the housing tax 
subsidy provided by the U.S. tax system, 
but do not incorporate the fact that the 
size of a mortgage on which interest is 
deductible is capped. 
We begin with a model of the user cost of 
ownership that assumes the real economic 
return to homeownership is fully taxed. 
Using that model as a benchmark, we then 
introduce tax incentives found in the U.S. 
tax system and consider the effects for tax 
payers who itemize deductions. The model 
reveals how the size of the housing tax sub-
sidy varies with the home price, mortgage 
interest rate, share of the house price that 
is debt ﬁ nanced, marginal income tax rate, 
and the property tax rate. Our extension 
of this model shows how the housing tax 
subsidy varies with the imposition of a cap 
on the size of mortgage. 
The benchmark case is that of fully 
taxing the real economic return to home-
ownership.3 The net–of–tax income (or 
economic proﬁ t) from owning a home 
with price PH and imputed rental value R 
for a homeowner with a marginal income 
tax rate of τ is
[1] ( )[ ( ) ],1− − + + −τ τ πR i m Pp H
where i is the interest rate, τp is the prop-
erty tax rate, m is the maintenance and 
depreciation cost rate, and π is the house 
price inﬂ ation rate. The term in parenthe-
ses captures the homeowner’s forgone 
equity cost minus capital gain. The equity 
cost includes the foregone interest on the 
housing asset plus the property taxes and 
maintenance and depreciation costs. The 
nominal capital gain to the owner is the 
rate of inﬂ ation applied to the price of 
the house. 
In a competitive equilibrium the net 
economic income from homeowner-
ship is driven to zero. Setting the above 
expression equal to zero and solving for 
R results in the equilibrium condition of 
the imputed rent expression: 
[2] R i m Pp H= + + −[ ] .τ π
This is the competitive equilibrium rent 
that would occur if the income tax system 
fully taxed the net income from housing as 
it taxes the interest earned on other invest-
ments. It represents the cost of housing to 
the homeowner. 
Housing Subsidy for Itemizers
We now consider the effects of the U.S. 
income tax system, which deviates from 
this standard. Most importantly, the U.S. 
income tax system does not tax the implicit 
rental income from housing, while it does 
permit deductions for mortgage interest 
and local property taxes. For an itemizer, 
the user cost is reduced due to deduct-
ibility of mortgage interest and property 
taxes. The foregone interest on the equity 
in the housing asset is the after–tax inter-
est rate (1 – τ)i. The interest rate paid on 
the debt portion of the housing asset is 
the same after–tax interest rate due to the 
MID. Using these features of the income 
tax code, the rental price of housing for an 
itemizer, RI, can be expressed as
[3] R i m P
R i P
I p H
p H
= − + + −
= − +
[( )( ) ]
( ) .
1 τ τ π
τ τ
The cost reduction provided by the federal 
tax code, or subsidy amount τ(i + τp)PH, 
varies directly with the taxpayer’s mar-
ginal tax rate, the interest rate, the property 
tax rate, and the house price. The housing 
subsidy is more valuable for high–income, 
home–owning taxpayers in regions of the 
country where home prices are high and 
property tax rates are also high. 
However, the MID is also currently 
limited to mortgages of $1 million or less 
for a married couple ($500,000 for a single 
 3 We ignore capital gains taxation in this treatment.
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ﬁ ler). Consequently, we introduce two 
new parameters in the user cost model: 
s, which represents the share of the mort-
gage in excess of the cap, and θ, which 
represents the share of the house price 
that is ﬁ nanced by debt. The product of 
these two parameters, θs, is the share of 
the house price that is debt ﬁ nanced and 
exceeds the cap, or the share of the house 
price that loses its tax preference. Since 
the tax subsidy for mortgage interest only 
applies to the share of the mortgage that 
does not exceed the cap, the introduction 
of a cap in the user–cost model yields the 
following expression for the rental price of 
housing for an itemizing taxpayer:
[4] R i
is i s
ICap p= − + − −
+ + −
[( ) ( ) ( )
( )(
1 1 1
1 1
τ τ τ θ
θ θ − + −
= − − +
= +
τ π
τ θ τ
τ θ
) ]
[ ( ) ]
(
m P
R i s P
R s
H
p H
I
1
i PH) .
The second term inside of the brackets in 
the un–simpliﬁ ed equation [4] represents 
the after–tax cost of equity financing 
(including the portions above and below 
the cap). The third and fourth terms cap-
ture the relative price of debt above and 
below the cap. The third term is the cost of 
ﬁ nancing with debt above the cap, while 
the forth term is the cost of ﬁ nancing with 
debt below the cap. The two simpliﬁ ed 
versions of equation [4] show how the 
user cost equation changes compared to 
the no–tax case and itemizer case when a 
cap is included in the model.
The share of a mortgage that exceeds the 
cap will not be subject to the differential 
net of tax interest rate on debt and equity 
if a taxpayer does not itemize, so the cap 
will not change the budget constraint for 
non–itemizers. For itemizers subject to 
the mortgage cap, the greater is the share 
of mortgage that exceeds the cap, the 
higher is the user cost of housing. Hence, 
the more binding is the cap, the greater is 
the impact on user cost. The size of this 
effect depends on the marginal income 
tax rate, the interest rate, and the house 
price. 
The impact of a cap on a home pur-
chaser’s budget constraint is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 1, by line segments 
AC and CB. Relative to the benchmark 
of fully taxing the real economic return 
to homeownership, the MID reduces the 
budget constraint’s slope, providing an 
incentive for households to consume more 
housing. Capping the size of mortgage 
that can be applied towards the deduction 
introduces a kink in the budget constraint. 
Beyond the kink, the constraint has the 
same slope as the pre–tax–subsidy budget 
constraint. This discrete change in user 
costs leads us to expect that, if user costs 
signiﬁ cantly impact household decision 
making, there would be a cluster of home-
owners at the kink point. 
As Figure 2 shows, this clustering is 
in fact what we observe, suggesting that 
the change in user cost resulting from the 
current–law cap is an important determi-
nant of household behavior. About 40 per-
cent of mortgages for amounts between 
$900,000 and $1.1 million in 2004 were 
for exactly the amount of the $1 million 
current–law cap. No other loan amount in 
the range shown in Figure 2 accounts for 
more than seven percent of the mortgage 
originations. This paper does not investi-
gate other sources of the peculiar distri-
bution of mortgage size. It does appear, 
however, like the subsidy reduction that 
results from the current–law cap on the 
MID is a contributing factor. 
Capping the deduction based on mort-
gage sizes reduces the subsidy by the 
amount τθsiPH relative to the previous 
model. Under current law, the vast majority 
of both new mortgages and new mortgage 
dollars are not constrained by the $1 mil-
lion cap. In 2004, less than one–half of one 
percent of all originated mortgages were for 
amounts in excess of $1 million; the average 
share of new mortgage dollars in excess of 
the current–law cap was just 0.13 percent. 
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However, this is not to say that the current 
cap is not affecting home purchases. Nearly 
25,000 mortgage originations exceeded 
$1 million, and those mortgages had an 
average of 24 percent of their value lose 
tax preference. At the MSA level, a high of 
nearly 4.8 percent of mortgage originations 
exceeded the current–law cap in the San 
Francisco MSA, and on average 1.44 per-
cent of mortgage dollars were affected.
Figure 1. Budget Constraint Incorporating Cap on MID
Figure 2. Density of Mortgage Originations by Loan Amount ($900,000 to $1.1 Million)
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
776
It should be kept in mind that these 
simulations, and those in the remainder 
of the paper, are static in nature. They do 
not account for any behavioral changes 
in home purchasing or ﬁ nancing that are 
(or would be) induced by the caps being 
considered. Although the current–law cap 
is not binding now for most home pur-
chasers, home price inﬂ ation is certainly 
pushing more mortgages toward the cap, 
especially in higher–priced areas.
MORTGAGE CAP SIMULATIONS
In this section we simulate the effects 
of three alternative cap proposals. First 
among the alternatives is the Panel’s 
recommendation, which partially adjusts 
the cap level on the basis of regional 
house prices. We also examine a uniform 
national cap and a cap that is fully adjusted 
for regional house prices. The level of 
the uniform national cap and the fully 
regionalized caps have been chosen so 
that, at the national level, the same aver-
age percentage of mortgage–origination 
dollars is constrained by these caps as by 
the Panel’s recommendation. Holding this 
factor constant will facilitate comparisons 
of the distributional effects of the various 
caps across regions of the country. Results 
for cap simulations of current law and all 
three alternatives are given at the MSA 
level in Table 1 for a sample of MSAs that 
represent the full range of the distribu-
tion of home prices. Results for all U.S. 
MSAs are available from the authors on 
request. 
To estimate the number of mortgage 
originations and the share of mortgage 
dollars affected by these caps, we use 
a dataset that provides both individual 
mortgage amounts and geographic loca-
tion identiﬁ ers. This dataset originated 
with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA), enacted by the U.S. Congress 
in 1975. HMDA was implemented by the 
Federal Reserve Board in its Regulation 
C, which requires lending institutions 
(banks, savings associations, credit 
unions, and other mortgage lending insti-
tutions) to report loan data. In 2005, for 
example, the HMDA dataset reports on 
approximately 33.6 million loan records 
for calendar year 2004, reported by 8,853 
ﬁ nancial institutions. The HMDA dataset 
includes both mortgage amounts and 
indicators for the metropolitan area and 
county of residence. It includes not only 
mortgage originations, but also mortgage 
applications; we use only the observations 
where a mortgage was originated for the 
purchase of a home. 
President’s Advisory Panel Proposed Cap
The Panel recommended capping the 
size of mortgage that can be used to offset 
tax liability according to regional home 
values.4 The regional mortgage limits 
were set by the Panel using a formula 
that is based on the Federal Housing 
Administration’s (FHA) limit for insuring 
mortgages. The FHA insures loans from 
private lenders to qualified high–risk 
borrowers for purchasing a home. The 
maximum amount of these loans varies 
by county, and is linked to the median 
house price for all other counties within 
the MSA. A more detailed description of 
the Panel’s proposal can be found in the 
published version of its ﬁ nal report. 
The caps that we have calculated based 
on the Panel’s recommendation use the 
2004 FHA loan limits, and range from 
a low of $210,758 to a high of $381,999. 
The FHA’s national ﬂ oor takes effect in 
calculating the caps for 2,598 counties; 
 4 The Panel also recommended replacing deductibility of mortgage interest paid with a new “Home Credit” to be 
claimed against tax liability. The proposed credit would be for 15 percent of the interest paid on a mortgage in 
any given tax year and would not be allowed for interest paid on mortgages of second homes or home–equity 
loans (as is allowed under current law).
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the FHA ceiling takes effect in calculating 
the caps for 90 counties, mostly in large 
metropolitan or costal areas, including 
25 of the 58 counties in California and 12 
of the 21 counties in New Jersey. We use 
the HMDA data for 2004, merged with 
a listing of the FHA limits by county for 
our analysis. 
After matching originations in the 
HMDA data with the proposed county–
specific caps, we were able to deter-
mine which borrowers would have lost 
tax–preferred status on some portion of 
the mortgage, as well as the share of their 
mortgage, s, that would have exceeded 
the cap.5
Row 3 of Table 1 reports that nationally 
about 13 percent of mortgage originations 
in 2004 would have been partially affected 
by a loss of tax preference.6 Of the 6.36 
million total mortgage originations in 
the United States, 837,871 (13.16 percent 
of the total) were for amounts exceeding 
the proposed caps. The average share 
of mortgage dollars subject to the caps 
would be 3.44 percent, compared to 0.13 
percent under current law. There are stark 
regional differences in the impact of the 
Panel’s caps across MSAs. The share of 
mortgage holders that would have some 
fraction of their mortgage affected by the 
Panel caps varies from a low of less than 
one percent in Odessa, TX, to a high of 
over 67 percent in San Francisco, CA. At 
least ﬁ ve percent of mortgage holders are 
subject to the Panel caps in about 80 per-
cent of the MSAs in the HMDA data. 
Taken as an average across MSAs 
(weighted by the number of mortgages 
taken out in 2004), the mean share of 
mortgage dollars subject to the Panel’s 
cap is 3.44 percent. The average share of 
mortgage dollars subject to the Panel’s 
proposed caps varies from as little as 0.15 
percent in Odessa, TX, to as much as 23 
percent in San Francisco, CA. Ten MSAs in 
the United States would have an average 
of at least ten percent of mortgage dollars 
exceeding the caps, and 35 MSAs would 
have at least ﬁ ve percent. 
The average subsidy for a typical item-
izing taxpayer in 2004 (with a marginal 
income tax rate of 25 percent and an 
annual mortgage interest rate of six per-
cent) would have been $2,344 compared 
to $2,626 under current law (again taken 
as a mortgage–weighted average), with 
standard deviations of $1,465 and $2,197, 
respectively. There is not much change 
in the subsidy amounts for MSAs at the 
bottom of the home–price distribution; 
however, the top of the distribution would 
experience signiﬁ cant declines. The aver-
age subsidy in San Francisco, for example, 
would decline by nearly $2,400 per year, 
from $7,303 to $4,909. For MSAs in the top 
25 percent of the mortgage–amount dis-
tribution,7 the average annual subsidy for 
new mortgage holders would be $3,070, 
which is $422 smaller than under current 
law. For MSAs in the bottom 25 percent of 
the same distribution, the average annual 
subsidy for new mortgage holders would 
be $1,442, which is $66 smaller than under 
current law. MSAs in the middle 50 per-
cent of the distribution would experience 
an average decrease in subsidy of $178, 
from $1,967 to $1,790. 
A Uniform National Cap 
As an alternative to the Panel’s rec-
ommendation, we simulate the effect of 
imposing a uniform national cap. We 
 5 HMDA data does not include the price of the home for which a mortgage was originated. Therefore, our esti-
mates will need to be multiplied by θ, the share of the house price that is debt–ﬁ nanced, in order to determine 
the effect on user cost. 
 6 Again, it should be kept in mind that these are static estimates, which do not take potential behavioral responses 
to the introduction of lower caps into account.
 7 We have tabulated MSAs according to their average mortgage amounts, and then examined the top 25 percent 
of MSAs according to this measure.
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choose the national cap so that the same 
share of total mortgage dollars exceeds the 
cap as with the Panel’s proposal. We ﬁ nd 
that a uniform national cap of $312,000 
will have this effect, binding about 3.4 
percent of mortgage dollars nation wide. 
Slightly fewer mortgage originations 
would exceed the national cap than the 
Panel’s caps: 811,730 mortgages or 12.75 
percent of the total (again, this is a static 
estimate, which does not account for 
potential behavioral responses to changes 
made to the cap). With this cap, the share 
of mortgage holders that would have 
some fraction of their mortgage affected 
varies from a low of 0.15 percent in 
Odessa, TX, to a high of over 77.14 percent 
in San Francisco, CA.
High–priced MSAs would once again 
be most affected in terms of the share 
of mortgage dollars that lose tax prefer-
ence, and to a greater extent than with 
the Panel’s caps (which were partially 
adjusted on the basis of regional home 
prices). The average share of mortgage 
dollars subject to the Panel’s proposed 
caps varies from as little as 0.05 percent in 
Odessa, TX, to as much as 32.02 percent 
in San Francisco, CA. Sixteen MSAs in the 
United States would have an average of 
at least ten percent of mortgage dollars 
exceeding the caps, and 30 MSAs would 
have at least ﬁ ve percent. 
The average subsidy for a typical item-
izing taxpayer in 2004 (with a marginal 
income tax rate of 25 percent and an 
annual mortgage interest rate of six per-
cent) would have been $2,325 compared to 
$2,626 under current law (again taken as 
a mortgage–weighted average). There is 
very little change in the subsidy amounts 
for MSAs at the bottom of the home–price 
distribution. Differences at the top of the 
distribution, on the other hand, would 
be noticeably larger than with the Panel’s 
caps. The average subsidy in San Fran-
cisco, for example, would decline by about 
$3,150 per year, from $7,303 to $4,153. For 
MSAs in the top 25 percent of the mort-
gage–amount distribution, the average 
annual subsidy for new mortgage holders 
would be $2,933, which is $558 smaller 
than under current law. For MSAs in the 
bottom 25 percent of the same distribu-
tion, the average annual subsidy would 
be $1,415, which is only $26 smaller than 
under current law. MSAs in the middle 50 
percent of the distribution would experi-
ence an average decrease in subsidy of 
$98, from $1,967 to $1,869.
A Cap That Binds the Same Percent of 
Mortgage Dollars across MSAs
Finally, we consider a cap that is bind-
ing for the same percent of mortgage 
dollars across MSAs, with the percent 
chosen to be consistent with the share of 
dollars affected by both the Panel caps 
and the national cap. This gives us what 
could be called a fully regionally adjusted 
cap for each MSA by keeping the share 
of mortgage dollars in excess of the cap 
equal to approximately 3.44 percent.8 Caps 
calculated in this manner range from a 
low of $102,000 in Odessa, TX, to a high 
of $769,000 in San Francisco. There are 
14 MSAs with caps in excess of $500,000, 
and 43 MSAs with caps higher than the 
uniform national cap from the previous 
section. Using this system, 13.7 percent 
of mortgage originations would have 
been for amounts in excess of the caps 
(slightly more than under the alternatives 
discussed above). The share of mortgage 
holders that would have some fraction 
of their mortgage affected by the fully 
regionalized caps varies from a low of 
8.93 percent in Brunswick, GA, to a high 
of over 23.08 percent in Fairbanks, AK.
High–priced MSAs would not lose 
as much tax preference under the fully 
 8 Since the HMDA data reports mortgages to the nearest $1,000, our caps are calculated with that level of 
precision. 
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regional cap as under the other types of 
caps. By design, the fully regional cap 
would hold the share of mortgage dollars 
subject to the cap constant at roughly 3.4 
percent. 
The average subsidy for a typical item-
izing taxpayer in 2004 (with a marginal 
income tax rate of 25 percent and an 
annual mortgage interest rate of six per-
cent) would have been $2,374 compared 
to $2,626 under current law. Average sub-
sidies would fall less severely for those in 
MSAs towards the top of the home–price 
distribution than under either the Panel’s 
caps or the uniform national cap. The 
average subsidy in San Francisco, for 
example, would decline by about $342 
per year, from $7,303 to $6,961. For the top 
25 percent of MSAs, the average annual 
subsidy would be $3,183, which is $309 
smaller than under current law. For MSAs 
in the bottom 25 percent of the distribu-
tion, the average annual subsidy would be 
$1,297, which is $144 smaller than under 
current law. MSAs in the middle 50 per-
cent of the distribution would experience 
an average decrease in subsidy of about 
$213, from $1,967 to $1,755. (For all three 
groups the decrease in subsidy is from 
8.8 to 10.8 percent of the original subsidy 
amount.)
The Effect of Caps on the User Cost of 
Owner–Occupied Housing
What ultimately matters to home pur-
chasers is how capping the MID will affect 
the user cost of housing. We follow equa-
tions [2], [3], and [4] and use our estimates 
of s to estimate differences in the user cost 
with and without the caps to the MID. To 
keep our focus on the effects of the caps, 
we hold other parameter estimates con-
stant across MSAs. We assume an annual 
maintenance rate of two percent, property 
tax rate of 1.75 percent, mortgage interest 
rate of six percent, marginal tax rate of 25 
percent, and house–price inﬂ ation net of 
depreciation at a rate of 1.3 percent. We 
must also make an adjustment to move 
from the share of mortgage dollars that 
lose tax preference (estimated above using 
the HMDA data) to the share of the house 
price that loses tax preference (which 
is the product θs). Since we are dealing 
with mortgage–origination data, we do 
this by assuming the conventional initial 
loan–to–value ratio of 80 percent across 
the board. 
Table 2 shows how the current–law 
cap and the three alternatives increase 
the average user cost of housing in MSAs 
across the house–price distribution. On 
average, the user cost of 2004 mortgage 
originations was increased very little by 
the current–law cap of $1 million relative 
to a no–cap baseline (by only 0.02 percent 
for the U.S. as a whole). The small subset 
of houses that were affected, however, 
experienced user costs that were about 4.4 
percent above the no–cap baseline. That 
is to say that we would underestimate 
the actual user cost of housing for these 
taxpayers by about 4.4 percent annually 
if we did not take the current–law cap 
into account. The increase in user cost for 
mortgages above the cap is a reﬂ ection 
of the average share of mortgage value 
exceeding the cap, which is almost 24 
percent for these taxpayers. 
The changes to the cap outlined by the 
Panel, as well as our national and fully 
regional caps, would all increase the 
user cost for the average mortgage in the 
United States by about 0.61 percent annu-
ally. For mortgages that are in excess of 
the current cap, the user cost under these 
alternative proposals would increase by 
between 7.4 and 9.2 percent from current 
law.
The bulk of the increase in user cost 
caused by the Panel’s caps and the uni-
form national cap would be on mortgage 
holders in high–priced areas. Under the 
Panel’s proposal, the ﬁ ve lowest–priced 
MSAs would all experience a user–cost 
increase that is 0.12 percent or less rela-
tive to the current–law baseline. The ﬁ ve 
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highest–priced MSAs would experience 
user costs ranging from 2.00 to 3.95 per-
cent higher than under the current–law 
baseline. The uniform national cap wid-
ens the difference between the user–cost 
changes experienced by those in MSAs 
at the bottom and the top of the house–
price distribution. With this cap, the 
bottom ﬁ ve MSAs would all experience 
user–cost increases of less than 0.04 per-
cent, and the top ﬁ ve MSAs would experi-
ence increases ranging from 3.03 percent 
to 5.62 percent (the hardest hit MSA being 
San Francisco). The fully regionalized 
caps would have only a slightly different 
impact on the user costs experienced by 
all MSAs, with the increases over the cur-
rent–law baseline ranging from 0.37–0.63 
percent. The differences in user–cost 
increases from the fully regional cap 
across MSAs are the result of looking 
at changes relative to the current–law 
baseline, which already incorporates the 
current–law cap.
An important caveat about these calcu-
lations must be noted before concluding. 
The shares of mortgages and house prices 
that exceed the various caps have been cal-
culated using mortgage origination data. 
Naturally, this share would be expected to 
fall towards zero over the lifetime of the 
mortgage as mortgage–holders increase 
their equity share in their homes. Conse-
quently, the shares exceeding the various 
caps as calculated here will overstate the 
shares exceeding the caps over the lifetime 
of the mortgage.9
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that capping the mort-
gage interest deduction alters the user cost 
of housing through the share of mortgage 
dollars above the cap. Our estimates show 
that while the current–law cap affects 
a negligible number of mortgages, its 
impact on the mortgages that are affected 
is not insubstantial (raising the aver-
age user cost for this sub–population of 
mortgages by an estimated 4.4 percent). 
We also simulate how a set of alternative 
caps would increase the share of mortgage 
dollars in excess of the cap, thus increasing 
the user cost of housing. 
The President’s Advisory Panel’s 
recommendation to create caps based 
partially on regional home prices would 
increase the user cost of housing by about 
0.61 percent on average across the country. 
Some MSAs would be relatively severely 
impacted, with the estimated user cost 
increasing by a high of 3.95 percent in the 
San Francisco MSA. High–priced homes 
that exceed the current–law cap of $1 mil-
lion would see their estimated user costs 
increase by an average of 8.79 percent. 
As catalogued in our mortgage–simula-
tions section, these changes can amount 
to MSA–wide average losses in tax 
savings ranging from less than $100/year 
in low–priced MSAs to over $3,000/
year. 
The other two alternative caps pre-
sented in this paper, a uniform national 
cap and a fully regionally adjusted cap, 
are designed to impact the same share of 
mortgage dollars as the Panel’s caps at 
the national level. These caps highlight 
the geographic distributional differences 
of moving from a national cap to a cap 
based on regional prices. The national 
cap would have a greater impact on 
high–priced areas than the Panel’s caps, 
with the average user cost increasing by 
a high of 5.62 percent in San Francisco. 
The fully regional cap shifts the burden 
towards low–priced MSAs relative to 
the Panel’s caps, increasing average user 
costs by an estimated 0.37–0.63 percent 
in all MSAs. 
 9 By way of illustration, if there is a $600,000 mortgage taken out in an MSA with a $400,000 cap, we would 
estimate a ﬁ rst–year s of 0.33. If we assume that the mortgage will be fully paid down over the course of 30 
years (with annual payments), however, the value of s over the lifetime of the mortgage would be about 0.17.
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Policy makers have already begun 
the discussion of whether the cap on the 
MID should be uniform or adjusted on 
the basis of regional differences in home 
prices. This choice will have implications 
for both efﬁ ciency and equity aspects of 
the subsidy. The equity question forces 
policy makers to weigh conﬂ icting notions 
of fairness. A uniform national cap is 
fair in the sense that it does not provide 
households with larger subsidies simply 
because they live in areas with high 
home prices, while a regionally adjusted 
cap is fair in the sense that it reduces the 
current subsidy proportionately across 
regions, regardless of home prices. The 
ﬁ rst notion of fairness may more accu-
rately capture a conception of how new 
home purchasers ought to be treated, 
while the second may better relate to how 
we ought to treat current homeowners. 
That is, going forward it would be inap-
propriate to provide larger subsidies for 
people who seek out homes in areas with 
high prices (effectively blunting the price 
mechanism). On the other hand, it would 
also be unfair to take different amounts 
of the subsidy away from people in dif-
ferent areas given that they made their 
home–purchase decisions on the basis of 
current law. The Panel’s recommendation, 
which is a compromise between a uniform 
national cap and fully adjusted regional 
caps, may appear attractive to those who 
prefer to split the difference between these 
conﬂ icting notions of fairness. Either tran-
sitional assistance or the gradual phasing 
in of caps that are not fully adjusted on 
the basis of regional home prices may also 
help to mediate along these lines. 
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